Note: Solve any 4 Cases Study’s
CASE:
I Managing the Guinness brand in the
face of consumers’ changing tastes
1997 saw the US$19 billion merger of Guinness and GrandMet to form Diageo, the world’s largest drinks company.
Guinness was the group’s top-selling beverage after Smirnoff vodka, and the
group’s third most profitable brand, with an estimated global value of US$1.2
billion. More than 10 million glasses of the popular stout were sold every day,
predominantly in Guinness’s top markets: respectively, the UK, Ireland,
Nigeria, the USA and Cameroon.
However, the famous dark stout with the white, creamy head was causing
some strategic concerns for Diageo. In 1999, for the first time in the 241-year
of Guinness, sales fell. In early 2002 Diageo CEO Paul Walsh announced to the
group’s concerned shareholders that global volume growth of Guinness was down 4
per cent in the last six months of 2001 and, more alarmingly, sales were also
down 4 per cent in its home market, Ireland. How should Diageo address falling
sales in the centuries-old brand shrouded in Irish mystique and tradition?
The changing face of the Irish
beer market
The Irish were very fond of beer and even fonder of Guinness. With
close to 200 litres per capita drunk each year—the equivalent of one pint per
person per day—Ireland ranked top in worldwide per capita beer consumption,
ahead of the Czech Republic and Germany.
Beer accounted for two-thirds of all alcohol bought in Ireland in 2001.
Stout led the way in volume sales and accounted for 40 per cent of all beer
value sales. Guinness, first brewed in 1759 in Dublin by Arthur Guinness,
enjoyed legendary status in Ireland, a national symbol as respected as the
green, white and gold flag. It was by far the most popular alcoholic drink in Ireland,
accounting for nearly one of every two pints of beer sold. Its nearest
competitors were Budweiser and Heineken, which held 13 per cent and 12 per cent
of the market respectively.
However, the spectacular economic growth of the Irish economy since the
mid-1990s had opened up the traditional drinking market to new cultures and
influences, and encouraged the travel-friendly Irish to try other drinks. Beer
and in particular stout were losing popularity compared with wine or the
recently launched RTDs (ready-to-drinks) or FABs (flavoured alcoholic
beverages), which the younger generation of drinkers considered trendier and
‘healthier’. As a Euromonitor report explained: Younger consumers consider dark
beers and stout to be old fashioned drinks, with the perceived stout or ale
drinker being an old, slightly overweight man and thus not in tune with image
conscious youth culture.
Beer sales, which once accounted for 75 per cent of all alcohol bought
in Ireland, were expected to drop to close to 50 per cent by 2006, while stout
sales were forecast to decrease by 12 per cent between 2002 and 2006.
Giving Guinness a boost in its
home market
With Guinness alone accounting for 37 per cent of Diageo’s volume in
the market, Guinness/UDV Ireland was one of the first to feel the pain caused
by the declining popularity of beer and in particular stout. A Euromonitor
report in February 2002 explained how the profile of the Guinness drinker,
typically men aged 21-plus, was affected: The average age of Guinness drinkers is
rising and this is bringing about the worrying fact that the size of the
Guinness target audience is falling. The rate of decline is likely to quicken
as the number of less brand loyal, non-stout drinking younger consumers
increases.
The report continued:
In Ireland, in particular, the consumer base for Guinness is shrinking
as the majority of 18 to 24 year olds consistently reject stout as a product
relevant to their generation, opting instead to consume lager or spirits.
Effectively, one-third of young Irish men and half of young Irish women
had reportedly never tried Guinness. A Guinness employee provided another
explanation. Guinness is similar to coffee in that when you’re young you drink
it [coffee] with sugar, but when you’re older you drink it without. It’s got a
similar acquired taste and once you’re over the initial hurdle, you’ll fall in
love with it.
In an attempt to lure young drinkers to the somewhat ‘acquired’
Guinness taste (40 per cent of the Irish population was under the age of 24)
Diageo had invested millions in developing product innovations and brand
building in Ireland’s 10,000 pubs, clubs and supermarkets.
Product innovation
Until the mid-1990s most Guinness in Ireland was drunk in a pint glass
in the local pub. The launch of product innovations in the form of a new
cooling mechanism for draft Guinness and the ‘widget’ technology applied to
cans and bottles attempted to modernize the brand’s image and respond to
increasing competition from other local and imported stouts and lagers.
‘A perfect head’ for canned Guinness
In 1989, and at a cost of more than £10 million, Guinness developed an
ingenious ‘widget’ device for its canned draft stout sold in ‘off-trade’
outlets such as supermarkets and off-licences. The widget, placed in the bottom
of the can, released a gas that replicated the draft effect.
Although over 90 per cent of beer in Ireland was sold in ‘on-trade’
pubs and bars, sale of beer in the cheaper ‘off-trade’ channel were slowly
gaining in importance. The Guinness brand manager at the time, John O’Keeffe,
explained how home drinkers could now enjoy a smoother, creamier head similar
to the one obtained in a pub thanks to the new widget technology:
When the can is opened, the pressure causes the nitrogen to be released
as the widget moves through the beer, creating the classic draft Guinness
surge.
Nearly 10 years later, in 1997, the ‘floating widget’ was introduced,
which improved the effectiveness of the device.
A colder pint
In 1997 Guinness Draft Extra Cold was launched in Ireland. An
additional chilled tap system could be added to the standard barrel in pubs,
allowing the Guinness to be served at 4ºC rather than the normal 6ºC. By
serving Guinness at a cooler temperature, Guinness/UDV hoped to mute the bitter
taste of the stout and make it more palatable for younger adults, who were
increasingly accustomed to drinking chilled lager, particularly in the summer
A cooler image for Guinness
In October 1999 the widget technology was applied to long-stemmed
bottles of Guinness. The launch was supported by a US$2 million TV and outdoor
board campaign. The packaging—with a clear, shiny plastic wrap, designed to
look like a pint complete with creamy head—was quite a departure from the
traditional Guinness look.
The objective was to reposition Guinness alongside certain similarly
packaged lagers and RTDs and offer younger adults a more fashionable way to
drink Guinness: straight from the bottle. It also gave Guinness easier access
to the growing number of clubs and bars that were less likely to serve
traditional draft Guinness easier access to the growing number of clubs and
bars that were less likely to serve traditional draft Guinness, which could be
kept for only six to eight weeks and took two minutes to pour. The RTDs, by
contrast, had a shelf-life of more than a year and were drunk straight from the
bottle.
However, financial analyst
remained sceptical about the Guinness product innovations, which had no
significant positive impact on sales or profitability:
The last news about the success of the recently introduced innovations
suggests that they have not had a notably material impact on Guinness brand
performance.
Brand building
Euromonitor estimates that, in 2000, Diageo invested between US$230 and
US$250 million worldwide in Guinness advertising and promotions. However, with
a cost-cutting objective, the company reduced marketing expenses in both
Ireland and the UK up to 10 per cent in 2001 and the number of global Guinness
agencies from six to two.
Nevertheless, Guinness remained one of the most advertised brands in
Ireland. It was the leading cinema advertiser and, in terms of advertising, was
second only to the national telecoms provider, Eircom. Guinness was also
heavily promoted at leading sporting and music events, in particular those that
were popular with the younger age groups.
The ultimate tribute to the brand was the opening of the new Guinness
Storehouse in Dublin in late 2000, a sort of Mecca for all Guinness fans. The
Storehouse was also a fashionable visitor centre with an art gallery and
restaurants, and regularly hosted evening events. The company’s design brief
highlighted another key objective:
To use an ultramodern facility to breathe life into an ageing brand, to
reconnect an old company with young (sceptical) customers.
As the Storehouse’s design firm’s director, Ralph Ardill, explained:
Guinness Storehouse had become the top tourist destination in Ireland,
attracting more than half a million people and hosting 45,000 people for
special events and training.
The Storehouse also had training facilities for Guinness’s bartenders
and 3000 Irish employees. The quality of the Guinness pint remained a high
priority for the company, which not only developed pub-like classrooms at the
Storehouse but also employed teams of draft technicians to teach barmen how to
pour a proper pint. The process involved two steps—the pour and the top-up—and
took a total of 119.5 seconds. Barmen also needed to learn how to check that
the pressure gauges were properly set and that the proportion of nitrogen to
carbon dioxide in the gas was correct.
The uncertain future of the
Guinness brand in Ireland
Despite Guinness/DUV’s attempt to appeal to the younger generation of
drinkers and boost its fading image, rumours persisted in Ireland about the
brand future. The country’s leading and respected newspaper, the Irish times,
reported in an article in July 2001:
The uncertainty over its future all adds to the air of crisis that is
building around Guinness Ireland Group four months ago…The review is not
complete and the assumption is that there is more bad news to come.
In the pubs across Ireland, the traditional Guinness drinkers looked on
anxiously as the younger generation drank Bacardi Breezers, Smirnoff Ices or
Californian wines. Could the goliath Guinness survive another two centuries?
Was the preference for these new drinks just a fad or fashion, or did Diageo
need to seriously reconsider how it marketed Guinness?
A quick solution?
In late February 2002, Diageo CEO Paul Walsh revealed that the company
was testing technology to cut the waiting time for a pint of Guinness from 1
minute 59 seconds to 15-25 seconds. Ultrasound could release bubbles in the
stout and form the head instantly, making a pint of Guinness that would be indistinguishable
from one produced by the slower, traditional method.
‘A two-minute pour is not relevant to our customers today,’ Walsh said.
A Guinness spokeswoman continued, ‘We have got to move with the times and the
brand must evolve. We must take all the opportunities that we can. In outlets
where it is really busy, if you walk in after nine o’clock in the evening there
will be a cloth over the Guinness pump because it takes longer to pour than
other drinks. Aware that some consumers might not be attracted by the
innovation, she added ‘It wouldn’t be put everywhere—only where people want a
quick pint with no effect on the quality.’
Although still being tested, the ‘quick-pour pint’ was a popular topic
of conversation in Dublin pubs, among barmen and customers alike. There were
rumours that it would be introduced in Britain only; others thought it would be
released worldwide.
Some market commentators viewed the quick-pour pint as an innovative
way to appeal to the younger, less patient segment in which Guinness had
under-performed. Others feared that the young would be unconvinced by the
introduction, and loyal customers would be turned off by what they
characterized as a ‘marketing u-turn’.
Question:
1.
From a
marketing perspective, what has Guinness done to ensure its longevity?
2.
How
would you characterize the Guinness brand?
3.
What
could Guinness do to attract younger drinkers? And to retain its older loyal
customer base? Can both be done at the same time?
CASE:
II The grey market
Introduction
The over-50s market has long been ignored by advertising and marketing
firms in favour of the market. The complexity of how to appeal to today’s
mature customers, without targeting their age, has proved just too challenging
for many companies. But this preoccupation with youth runs counter to
demo-graphic changes. The over-50s represent the largest segment of the
population, across western developed countries, due largely to the post-Second
World War baby boom. The sheer size of this grey market, which will continue to
grow as birth and mortality rates fall, coupled with its phenomenal spending
power, presents enormous opportunities for business. However, successfully
unleashing its potential will depend on companies truly understanding the
attitudes, lifestyles and purchasing interests of this post-war generation.
Demographic forces
Following the Second World War many countries experienced a baby boom
phenomenon as returning soldiers began families. This, coupled with a more
positive outlook on the future, resulted in the baby boom generation, born
between 1946 and 1964. Now beginning to enter retirement, this affluent group
globally numbers approximately 532 million. In Western Europe they account for
the largest proportion of the total population at 14.9%, followed closely by
14.2% in North America and 13.5 % in Australia.
Table 1: Global population aged 45-54 by region:
baby boomers as a % of the total population 1990/2002
|
Baby boomers as a % total population
|
1990
|
2002
|
% point change
|
|
Western Europe
|
12.9
|
14.9
|
2.0
|
|
North America
|
9.9
|
14.2
|
4.3
|
|
Australasia
|
10.4
|
13.5
|
3.1
|
|
Eastern Europe
|
9.7
|
13.0
|
3.3
|
|
Asia-Pacific
|
7.8
|
9.8
|
2.0
|
|
Latin America
|
6.6
|
8.4
|
1.8
|
|
Africa/Middle East
|
2.6
|
2.3
|
20.3
|
|
WORLD
|
7.9
|
9.5
|
1.6
|
The grey market is big and getting bigger. Between 1990 and 2002 the
global baby boomer population increased by 41%. The rate of growth is predicted
to decrease to 35% between 2002 and 2015. Particularly noteworthy is the
predicted increase in the proportion of baby boomers in many Western European
countries, such as Austria, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the UK. In developed
countries, according to the United Nations, the percentage of elderly people
(60+) is forecast to rise from one-fifth of the population to one-third by
2050. The growth in the elderly population is exacerbated by falling fertility
rates in many developed countries, coupled with a rise in human longevity.
The influences and buyer
behaviour patterns of baby boomers
The members of the baby boomer generation are quite unlike their more
conservative parents’ generation. They are the children of the rebellious
‘swinging sixties’, growing up on the sounds of the Beatles and the Rolling
Stones. Better educated than their parents, in a time of greater prosperity,
they indulged in more hedonistic lifestyle. It has been said that they were the
first ‘me generation’. Now, in later life, they have retained their liberal,
adventurous and youthful attitude to life. Aptly termed ‘younger older people’
they abhor antiquated stereotypes of elderly people, preferring to be defined
by their attitude rather than their age.
Baby boomers are also tend to be very wealthy. Many are property owners
and may have gained an inheritance from parents or other relatives. They have
higher than average incomes or have retired with private pension plans. With
their children having flown the nest they have greater financial freedom and
more time to indulge themselves. Having worked all their lives, and educated
their children, many baby boomers do not believe it is their responsibility to
safeguard the financial future of their children by carefully protecting their
children’s inheritance. They are instead liquidating their assets, intent on
enjoying their later life to full, often through conspicuous consumption.
Based on research conducted by Euromonitor, the main areas of
expenditure in the baby boomer market are financial services, tourism, food and
drink, luxury cars, electrical/electronic goods, clothing, health products, and
DIY and gardening.
Table 2: Global population aged 45-54 in thousands
by country: developed countries 2002-2015
|
Country
|
2002
|
2010
|
2015
|
%change 2002/2015
|
|
Austria
|
1,059
|
1,277
|
1,371
|
29
|
|
Spain
|
4,921
|
5,741
|
6,189
|
26
|
|
Germany
|
10,991
|
12,963
|
13,508
|
26
|
|
Italy
|
7,684
|
8,591
|
9,347
|
23
|
|
UK
|
7,786
|
8,731
|
9,388
|
22
|
|
New Zealand
|
521
|
607
|
613
|
21
|
|
Ireland
|
474
|
529
|
555
|
18
|
|
Switzerland
|
997
|
1,120
|
1,159
|
17
|
|
Australia
|
2,661
|
3,006
|
3,057
|
16
|
|
Greece
|
1,359
|
1,476
|
1,559
|
15
|
|
Canada
|
4,505
|
5,320
|
5,122
|
15
|
|
Netherlands
|
2,301
|
2,492
|
2,604
|
14
|
|
Portugal
|
1,334
|
1,438
|
1,511
|
13
|
|
Norway
|
612
|
640
|
678
|
13
|
|
Denmark
|
745
|
761
|
802
|
11
|
|
USA
|
38,951
|
44,140
|
42,207
|
8
|
|
Belgium
|
1,423
|
1,549
|
1,526
|
8
|
|
Sweden
|
1,206
|
1,179
|
1,233
|
2
|
|
Japan
|
18,344
|
15,661
|
16,459
|
-10
|
|
Finland
|
820
|
749
|
718
|
-12
|
|
France
|
8,266
|
7,626
|
7,292
|
-12
|
Figure 1 Global Baby boomer
market: % analysis by broad sector 2002 (% value)
Note: sectors valued on the basis of estimates by senior managers in
major companies in each sector, consumer expenditure and industry sector data.
Unsurprisingly the financial sector is the largest in this market. Baby
boomers are concerned with being financially secure in their retirement. An
ageing population, coupled with a rise in human longevity, is giving rise to a
pensions crisis across Western Europe. Baby boomers are therefore right to be preoccupied
with how they will maintain their lifestyle over the long term. They are
actively engaging in financial planning, both before and after retirement.
Popular financial service products include endowments, life insurance, personal
pensions, PEPs and ISAs.
Baby boomers have adventurous attitudes with a desire to see the world.
In their retirement foreign travel is a key expenditure. Given their greater
levels of sophistication and education, baby boomers are much more demanding of
holidays that suit their lifestyles. This group is very diverse, with holiday
interests ranging from action-packed adventures to culturally rich experiences.
Baby boomers want to maintain a youthful appearance in line with their
youthful way of living. Fear of becoming invisible is a genuine concern among
older generations. This image conciousness is reflected in their spending on
clothing, cosmetics and anti-ageing products. Luxury cars also a key status
symbols for this group.
The home is another area of expenditure. Once children have flown the
nest, many baby boomers redecorate the home to suit their needs. Electrical and
electronic purchases are key indulgences among these technologically savvy
consumers. Gardening is another pastime enjoyed by older generations. Health is
also a priority. Baby boomers invest in private health insurance and
over-the-counter pharmaceutical products to maintain their healthy lives.
Business opportunities
The sheer size of the grey market, which is getting bigger in many
countries—characterized by consumers with disposable income, ample free time,
interest in travel, concern about financial security and health, awareness of
youth culture and brands and desire for aspirational living—makes this market
enormously attractive to many business sectors. Pharmaceuticals, health and
beauty, technology, travel financial services, luxury cars, lavish food and
entertainment are key growth sectors for the grey market. However, successfully
tapping into this market will depend on companies truly understanding the
attitudes, lifestyles and purchasing interests of this post-war generation.
Communicating with this group is a tricky business, but, done right, it can be
hugely rewarding.
When targeting the older consumer it is important to target their lifestyle
and not their age. Older people do not want to be reminded, in a patronizing
way, of their age or what they should be doing now they are a certain stage in
life. With an interest in maintaining a youthful way of life these consumers
are interested in similar brands to those that appeal to younger generations.
The key for the companies is to find a way of making their brands also appeal
to an older consumer without explicitly targeting their age. One tried-and
tested method of targeting this group is to use nostalgia. Mercedes Benz used
the Janis Joplin song ‘Oh Lord won’t you buy me a Mercedes Benz’ to great
effect despite the obvious irony in that the song was written to highlight the
dangers of materialism! Volkswagen’s new retro-style Beetle has also been
popular among this group. In the tourism sector Saga Holidays, the leader in
holidays for the over-50s, has changed its product offering to reflect changing
trends among this group. In line with the more adventurous attitudes of many
older consumers it now offers more action-packed adventure holidays to
far-flung destinations.
More recently, Thomas Cook has rebranded it over-50s ‘Forever Young’
programme to reflect the diverse interest of its target customers. Its new
primetime brochure targets five distinct groups with the following holiday
types: ‘Discover’, ‘Learn’, ‘Relax’, ‘Active’ and ‘Enjoy Life’.
Conclusion
The over-50s represent the largest segment of the population across
Western developed countries. This affluent market is big and getting bigger.
Having ignored it for so long marketers are finally beginning to see the
enormous opportunities presented by the grey market. But conquering this market
will not be easy. The baby boomer generation is quite unlike its predecessors.
With a youthful and adventuresome spirit these ‘younger older people’ want to
be defined by their attitude and not by their age. Only time will tell whether
today’s marketers are up to the challenge.
Questions:
1.
Why is
the grey market so attractive to business?
2.
Identify
the influences on the purchasing behaviour of the over-50s consumer.
3.
Discuss
the challenges involved in targeting the grey market.
CASE:
III Nivea: managing an umbrella brand
‘In many countries consumer are convinced that Nivea is a local brand,
a mistake which Beiersdoft, the German makers, take as a compliment.’
(Quoted on leading brand consultancy Wolff-Olins’ website,
www.wolff-olins.com)
An ode to Nivea’s success
In May 2003, a survey of ‘Global Mega Brand Franchises’ revealed that
the Nivea Cosmetics brand had presence in the maximum number of product
categories and countries. The survey, conducted by US-based ACNielsen, aimed at
identifying those brands that had ‘successfully evolved beyond their original
product categories’. A key parameter was the presence of these brands in
multiple product categories as well as countries.
Nivea’s performance in this study prompted a yahoo.com news article to
name it the ‘Queen of Mega Brands’. This title was appropriate since the brand
was present in over 14 product categories and was available in more than 150
countries. Nivea was the market leader in skin creams and lotions in 28
countries, in facial cleansing in 23 countries, in facial skin care in 18
countries, and in suntan products in 15 countries. In many of those countries,
it was reportedly believed to be a brand of local origin—having been present in
them for many decades. This fact went a long way in helping the brand attain
leadership status in many categories and countries (see Table 3).
Table 3 Nivea: market positions
|
CATEGORY
|
Skin care
|
Baby care
|
Sun protection
|
Men’s care
|
|
|
COUNTRY
|
|||||
|
Austria
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
1
|
|
|
Belgium
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
1
|
|
|
UK
|
1
|
3
|
-
|
1
|
|
|
Germany
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
1
|
|
|
France
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
|
|
Italy
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
1
|
|
|
Netherlands
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
1
|
|
|
Spain
|
1
|
4
|
-
|
1
|
|
|
Switzerland
|
1
|
1
|
4
|
1
|
|
The study covered 200 consumer
packaged goods brands from over 50 global manufacturers. The brands had to be
available in at least 15 of the countries studied; the same name had to be used
in at least three product categories and meet franchise in at least three of
the five geographical regions.
In its home country Germany, too, many of Nivea’s products were the
market leaders in their segments. This market leadership status translated into
superior financial performance. Between 1991 and 2001, Nivea posted
double-digit growth rates every year. For 2001, the brand generated revenues of
€2.5 billion, amounting to 55 per cent of the parent company’s (Beiersdoft)
total revenue for the year. The 120-year-old, Hamburg-based Beiersdoft has
often been credited with meticulously building the Nivea brand into the world’s
number one personal care brand. According to a survey conducted by ACNielsen in
the late 1990s, the brand had a 15 per cent share in the global skin care
products market. While Nivea had always been the company’s star performer, the
1990s were a period of phenomenal growth for the brand. By successfully
extending what was essentially a ‘one-product wonder’ into many different
product categories, Beiersdoft had silenced many critics of its umbrella
branding decision.
The marketing game for Nivea
Millions of customers across the world have been familiar with the
Nivea brand since their childhood. The visual (colour and packaging) and
physical attributes (feel, smell) of the product stayed on in their minds.
According to analysts, this led to the formation of a complex emotional bond
between customers and the brand, a bond that had strong positive under-tones.
According to a superbrands.com. my
article, Nivea’s blue colour denoted sympathy, harmony, friendship and loyalty.
The white colour suggested external cleanliness as well as inner purity.
Together, these colours gave Nivea the aura of an honest brand.
To customers, Nivea was more than a skin care product. They associated
Nivea with good health, graceful ageing and better living. The company’s
association Nivea with many sporting events, fashion events and other
lifestyle-related events gave the brand a long-lasting appeal. In 2001,
Franziska Schmiedebach, Beiersdoft’s Corporate Vice President (Face Care and
Cosmetics), commented that Nivea’s success over the decades was built on the
following pillars: innovation, brand extension and globalization (see Table 4
for the brand’s sales growth from 1995-2002)
Table 4 Nivea: worldwide sales growth (%)
|
Sales Growth
|
1995
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
|
In
Million €
|
1040
|
1166
|
1340
|
1542
|
1812
|
2101
|
2458
|
2628
|
|
In
per cent
|
9.8
|
12.1
|
14.9
|
15.1
|
17.5
|
16.0
|
17.0
|
6.9
|
Innovation and brand extensions
Innovation and brand extensions went hand in hand for Nivea. Extensions
had been made back in the 1930s and had continued in the 1960s when the face
care range Nivea Visage was launched. However, the first major initiative to
extend the brand to other products came in the 1970s. Naturally, the idea was
to cash in on Nivea’s strong brand equity. The first major extension was launch
of ‘Nivea For Men’ aftershave in the 1970s. Unlike the other aftershaves
available in market, which caused the skin to burn on application, Nivea For
Men soothed the skin. As a result, the product became a runaway success.
The positive experience with the aftershave extension inspired the
company to further explore the possibilities of brand extensions. Moreover,
Beiersdoft felt that Nivea’s unique identity, the values it represented
(trustworthiness, simplicity, consistency, caring) could easily be used to make
the transition to being an umbrella brand. The decision to diversify its
product range was also believed to have influenced by intensifying competitive
pressures. L’Oreal’s Plenitude range, Procter & Gamble’s Oil of Olay range,
Unilever’s Pond’s range, and Johnson & Johnson’s Neutrogena range posed
stiff competition to Nivea.
Though Nivea was the undisputed market leader in the mass-market face
cream segment worldwide, its share was below Oil of Olay’s, Pond’s and
Plenitude’s in the US market. While most of the competing brands had a wide
product portfolio, the Nivea range was rather limited. To position Nivea as a
competitor in a larger number of segments, the decision to offer a wider range
inevitable.
Beiersdoft’s research centre—employing over 150 dermatological and
cosmetics researchers, pharmacists and chemists—supported its thrust on
innovations and brand extensions. During the 1990s, Beiersdoft launched many
extensions, including men’s care products, deodorants (1991), Nivea Body
(1995), and Nivea Soft (1997). Most of these brand extension decisions could be
credited to Rolf Kunisch, who became Beiersdoft’s CEO in the early 1990s. Rolf Kunisch firmly believed in the company’s
‘twin strategy’ of extension and globalization.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Nivea umbrella brand
offered over 300 products in 14 separate segments of the health and beauty
market (see Table 5 and Figure 2 for information on Nivea’s brand extensions).
Commenting on Beiersdoft’s belief in umbrella branding, Schmiedebach said,
‘Focusing your energy and investment on one umbrella brand has strong
synergetic effects and helps build leading market positions across categories.’
A noteworthy aspect of the brand extension strategy was the company’s ability
to successfully translate the ‘skin care’ attributes of the original Nivea
cream to the entire gamut of products.
Table 5 Nivea: brand portfolio
|
Category
|
Products
|
|
Nivea Bath Care
|
Shower gels, shower specialists, bath foams, bath specialists, soaps,
kids’ products, intimate care
|
|
Nivea Sun (sun care)
|
Sun protection lotion, anti-ageing sun cream, sensitive sun lotion,
sun-spray, children’s sun protection, deep tan, after tan, self –tan, Nivea
baby sun protection
|
|
Nivea Beaute (colour cosmetics)
|
Face, eyes, lips, nails
|
|
Nivea For Men (men’s care)
|
Shaving, after shaving, face care, face cleansing
|
|
Nivea Baby (baby care)
|
Bottom cleansing, nappy rash protection, general cleansing,
moisturizing, sun protection
|
|
Nivea Body (body care)
|
Essential line, performance line, pleasure line
|
|
Nivea Crème
|
Nivea crème
|
|
Nivea Deodorants
|
Roll-ons, sprays, pump sprays, sticks, creams, wipes, compact
|
|
Nivea Hand (hand care)
|
Hand care lotions and creams
|
|
Nivea Lip Care
|
Basic care, special care, cosmetic care, extra protection care
|
|
Nivea Visage (face care)
|
Daily cleaning, deep cleaning, facial masks (cleaning/care), make-up
remover, active moisture care, advanced repair care, special care
|
|
Nivea Vital (mature skin care)
|
Basic face care, specific face care, face cleansing products, body
care
|
|
Nivea Soft
|
Nivea soft moisturizing cream
|
|
Nivea Hair Care
|
Hair care (shampoos, rinse, treatment, sun); hair styling (hairspray
and lacquer, styling foams and specials, gels and specials)
|
Figure 2 Nivea Universe
 |
The company ensured that each of its products addressed a specific need
of consumers. Products in all the 14 categories were developed after being
evaluated on two parameters with respect to the Nivea mother brand. First, the
new product had to be based on the qualities that the mother brand stood for
and, second, it ha to offer benefits that were consistent with those that the
mother brand offered. Once a new product cleared the above test, it was
evaluated for its ability to meet consumer needs and its scope for proving
itself to be a leader in the future. For instance, a Nivea shampoo not only had
to clean hair, it also had to be milder and gentler than other shampoos in the
same range.
Beiersdoft developed a ‘Nivea Universe’ framework for streamlining and
executing its brand extension efforts. This framework consisted of a central
point, an inner circle of brands and an
outer circle of brands (see Figure 2)
The centre of the model housed the ‘mother brand’, which represented
the core values of trustworthiness, honesty and reliability. While the brands
in the inner circle were closely related to the core values of the Nivea brand,
the brands in the outer circle were seen as extensions of these core values.
The inner-circle brands strengthened the existing beliefs and values associated
with the Nivea brand. The outer circle brands, however, sought to add new
dimensions to the brand’s personality, thereby opening up avenues, for future
growth.
The ‘global-local’ strategy
The Nivea brand retained its strong German heritage and was treated as
a global brand for many decades. In the early days, local managers believed
that the needs of customers from their countries were significantly different
from those of customers in other countries. As a result, Beiersdoft was forced
to offer different product formulations an packaging, and different types of
advertising support. Consequently, it incurred high costs.
It was only in the 1980s that Beiersdoft took a conscious decision to
globalize the appeal of Nivea. The aim to achieve a common platform for the
brand on a global scale and offer customers from different parts of the world a
wider variety of product choices. This was radical departure from its earlier
approach, in which product development and marketing efforts were largely
focused on the German market. The new decision was not only expected to solve
the problems of high costs, it was also expected to further build the core
values of the brand.
To globalize the brand, the company formulated strategies with the help
of a team of ‘international’ experts with ‘local expertise’. This team
developed new products for all the markets. Their responsibilities included,
among others, deciding about the way in which international advertising
campaigns should be adapted at the local level. The idea was to leave the
execution of strategic decisions to local partners. However, Beiersdoft
monitored the execution to ensure that it remained in line with the global
strategic plan.
This way, Beiersdoft ensured that the nuances of consumer behaviour at
the local level understood and that their needs were addressed. Company sources
claimed that by following the above approach, it was easy to transfer know-how
between headquarters and the local offices. In addition, the motivation level
of the local partners also remained on the higher side.
The company established a set of guidelines that regulated how the
marketing mix of a new product/brand was to be developed. These guidelines
stipulated norms with respect to product, pricing, promotion, packaging and
other related issues. For instance, a guideline regarding advertising read,
‘Nivea advertising is about skin care. It should be present visually and
verbally. Nivea advertising is simple, it is unpretentious and human.’
Thus all advertisements for any Nivea product depicted images related
to ‘skin care’ and ‘unpretentious human life’ in one way or the other. The
company consciously decided not to use supermodels to promote its products. The
predominant colours in all campaigns remained blue and white. However, local
issues were also kept in mind. For instance, in the Middle East, Nivea relied
more on outdoor media as it worked out to be much more cost-effective. And
since showing skin in the advertisements went against the region’s culture, the
company devised ways of advertising skin without showing skin.
Many brand management experts have spoken of the perils of umbrella
management, such as brand dilution and the lack of ‘change’ for consumers.
However, the umbrella branding strategy worked for Beiersdoft. In fact, the
company’s growth was the most dynamic since its inception during 1990s—the
decade when the brand extension move picked up momentum. The strong yearly
growth during the 1990s and the quadrupling of sales were attributed by company
sources to the thrust on brand extension.
Questions
1.
Discuss
the reasons for the success of the Nivea range of products across the world.
Why did Beiersdoft decide to extend the brand to different product categories?
In the light of Beiersdoft’s brand extension of Nivea, critically comment on
the pros and cons of adopting an umbrella branding strategy. Compare the use of
such a strategy with the use of an independent branding strategy.
2.
According
to you, what are the core values of the Nivea brand? What type of brand
extension framework did Beiersdoft develop to ensure that these core values id
not get diluted? Do you think the company was able to protect these core
values? Why/why not?
3.
What
were the essential components of Beiersdoft’s global expansion strategy for
Nivea? Under what circumstances would a ‘global-strategy-local execution’
approach be beneficial for a company? When and why should this approach be
avoided?
CASE:
IV Pret a Manger: passionate about food
Introduction
Pret a Manger (French for ‘ready to eat’) is a chain of coffee shops
that sells a range of upmarket, healthy sandwiches and desserts as well as a
variety o coffees to an increasingly discerning set of lunchtime customers.
Started in London, England, in 1986 by two university graduates, Pret a Manger
has more than 120 stores across the UK. In 2002 it sold 25 million sandwiches
and 14 million cups of coffee, and had a turnover of over £100 million.
Buckingham Palace reportedly orders more than £1000 worth of sandwiches a week
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair has had Pret sandwiches delivered to number 10 Downing Street for working
lunches. The company also has ambitious plans to expand further—it already has
stores in New York, Hong Kong and Tokyo,
and has set its sights on further international growth.
Background and company history
In 1986, Pret a Manger was founded with one shop, in central London,
and a £17,000 loan, by two property law graduates, Julian Metcalf and Sinclair Beecham,
who had been students together at the University of Westminster in the early
1980s. At that time the choice of lunchtime eating in London and other British
cities was more limited than it is today. Traditionally, some ate in
restaurants while many favoured that well-known British institution, the pub,
as a choice for lunchtime eating and drinking. There was, however, a growing
awareness among many people of the benefits of healthy eating and a healthy
lifestyle, and lunchtime habits were changing. There was a general trend
towards taking shorter lunch brakes and, among office workers, to take lunch at
their desks. For those who wanted food to take away, the choice in fast food
was dominated by the large chains such as McDonald’s, Burger King and Kentucky
Fried Chicken (now KFC) while other types of carry-out food, such as pizzas,
were also available.
Sandwiches also played an important part in British lunchtime eating.
Named after its eighteenth-century inventor, the Earl of Sandwich, the humble
sandwich had long been a popular British lunch choice, especially for those
with little time to spare. Prior to Pret’s arrival on the scene, sandwiches
were sold mainly either pre-packed in supermarkets and high-street variety
chain stores such as Marks and Spencer and Boots, or in the many small sandwich
bars that were to be found in the business districts of large cities like
London, Sandwich bars were usually small, independently owned or family run
shops that made sandwiches to order for customers who waited in a queue, often
out on to the pavement outside.
Dissatisfied with the quality of both the food and service from
traditional sandwich bars, Metcalf and Beecham decided that Pret a Manger
should offer something different. They wanted Pret’s food to be high quality
and healthy, and preservative and additive free. In the beginning, they shopped
for the food themselves at local markets and returned to the store where they
made the sandwiches each morning. Pret’s offering was based around
premium-quality sandwiches and other health-orientated lunches including
salads, sushi and a range of desserts, priced higher than at traditional
sandwich bars, and sold pre-packed in attractive and convenient packaging ready
to go. There was also a choice of different coffees, as well as some healthy
alternatives. Service aimed to be fast and friendly go give customers a minimum
of queuing time.
Pret a Manger: ‘Passionate
about What We do’
Pret a Manger strongly emphasizes the quality of its products. Its
promotional material and website claims that it is:
‘passionate about food, rejecting the use of obscure chemicals,
additives and preservatives common in so much of the prepared and fast food on
the market today…it there’s a secret to our success so far we like to think its
determination to focus continually on quality—not just our food, but in every
aspect of what we do’.
Great importance is also placed on freshness. Unlike those sold in
high-street shops or supermarkets, Pret’s sandwiches are all hand-made by staff
in each shop starting at 6.30 every morning, rather than being prepared and
delivered by a supplier or from a central location. Metcalf and Beecham believe
this gives their sandwiches a freshness and distinctiveness. All food that
hasn’t been sold in the shops by the end of the day is given away free to local
charities.
Careful sourcing of supplies for quality has also always been
important. Genetically modified ingredients are banned and the tuna Pret buys,
for example, must be ‘dolphin friendly’. There is also a drive for constant
product improvement and innovation—the company claims that its chocolate
brownie dessert has been improved 33 times over the last few years—and, on
average, a new product is tried out in the stores every four days. Aware that
some of its customers are increasingly health conscious, Pret’s website menu
carefully lists not only what is available, but also the ingredients and
nutritional values in terms of energy, protein, fats and dietary fibre for each
item.
The level and quality of service from staff in the shop is a critical
factor. The stores are self-service, with customers helping themselves to
sandwiches and other products form the supermarket-style refrigerated cabinets.
Staff at the counter at the back of the store then serve customers coffee and
take payment. Service is friendly, smiling and efficient, in contrast to many
retail and restaurant outlets in Britain where, historically, service quality
has not always been high. Prêt puts an emphasis on human resource management issues
such as effective recruitment and training so as to have frontline staff who
can show the necessary enthusiasm and also remain fast and courteous under the
pressure of a busy lunchtime sales period. These staff are usually young and
enthusiastic, some are students, many are international. The pay they receive
is above the fast-food industry average and staff turnover is 98 per cent a
year, which sounds high—however, this is against an industry norm of around 150
per cent. In 2001, Pret had 55,000 applications for 1500 advertised vacancies.
Recently, Fortune magazine
voted Pret one of the top 10 companies to work for in Europe. According to its
own promotional recruitment material, Pret is an attractive and fun place to
work: ‘We don’t work nights, we wear jeans, we party!’ Service quality is
checked regularly by the use of mystery shoppers: if a shop receives a good
report, then the staff there receive a 75p an hour bonus in the week of the
visit. Head office managers also visit stores on a regular basis and every
three or four months every one of these managers works as a ‘buddy’, where they
spend a day making sandwiches and working on the floor in one of the shops to
help them keep in touch with what is going on. Store employees work in teams
and are briefed daily, often on the basis of customer responses that come in
from in-store reply cards, telephone calls and the company website. The
website, which, lists the names and phone numbers of its senior executives,
actively invites customers to comment or complain about their experience with
Pret, and encourages them to contact the company. Great importance is placed on
this customer feed-back, both positive and negative, which is discussed at
weekly management meetings.
The design of the stores is also distinctive. Prominently featuring the
company logo, they are fitted out in a high-tech with metal cladding and
interiors in Pret’s own corporate dark red colour. Each store plays music,
helping to create a stylish and lively atmosphere. Although the shops mainly
sell carry out food and coffee in the morning and through the lunchtime period,
many also have tables and seating where customers can drink coffee and eat
inside the store or, weather permitting, on the pavement outside.
Growth and competition
Three years after the first Pret shop was launched another was opened
and, after that, the chain began to grow so that, by 1998, there were 65
throughout London. In the late 1990s stores were also opened in other British
cities such as Bristol, Cambridge and Manchester. Although growth in the UK has
been rapid—between 2000 and 2002 the company opened 40 new outlets and there
are over 120 throughout Britain—Pret’s policy has always been to own and manage
all its own stores and not to franchise to other operators. In 2002, £1 million
was spent in launching an Internet service that enables customers to order
sandwiches online.
Plans for international growth have been more cautious. In 2000 the
company made its first move overseas when it opened a shop near Wall Street in
New York. However, there were problems on several fronts in moving into the
USA. Metcalf is quoted saying, ‘As a private company its very difficult to set
up abroad. We didn’t know where to begin in New York—we ended up having all the
equipment for the shop made here and shipped over.’ There were also staffing
and service quality difficulties—Pret reportedly found it difficult to recruit
people in New York who had the required friendliness to serve in the stores and
had to import British staff. Despite these problems, several other shops in New
York have followed and, in 2001, Pret opened its first outlet in Hong Kong.
During the 1990s, coffee shops boomed as the British developed a
growing taste for drinking coffee in pavement cafes, and competition for Pret
grew as other chains entered the fray. Rivals like Coffee Republic, Caffè Nero,
Costa Coffee (now owned by leisure group Whitbread) Aroma (owned by McDonald’s)
and American worldwide operator Starbucks all came into the market, as well as a
number of smaller independents. All these chains offer a wide range of coffees
but with varying product offerings in terms of food, pricing and style
(Starbucks, for example, offers comfortable arm-chairs around tables, which
encourage people to linger or work in a laptop in the store). In a London
shopping street it is not uncommon to see three or four rival outlets next door
to or within a few yards of each other. However, it quickly became clear that
the sector was overcrowded and, apart from Starbucks, some of the other chains
reportedly struggled to make a profit. In 2002 Coffee Republic was taken over
by Caffè Nero, which also eventually acquired the ailing Aroma chain from
McDonald’s. Costa Coffee was the largest chain overall with over 300 shops throughout
Britain, while Starbucks was expanding aggressively and aimed to have an
eventual 4000 stores worldwide.
The future
As work and lifestyles get busier, the demand for convenience and fast
foods continues to grow. In 2000, some estimates put the total value of the
fast-food market in Britain, excluding sandwiches, at over £6 billion and
growing about £200-£300 million a year. While the growth in sales of some types
of fast food, like burgers, was showing signs of slowing down, sandwiches
continued to increase in popularity so that by 2002 sales wee an estimated £3
billion. Customers are also getting more health conscious and choosy about what
they eat and, increasingly, want nutritional information about food from
labelling and packaging.
In January 2001, in a surprise move, Pret’s two founders sold a 33 per
cent stake in the company to fast-food giant McDonald’s for an estimated £25
million. They claim that McDonald’s will not have any influence over what Pret
does or the products it sells, but that the investment by McDonald’s will help
their plan for future development. According to Metcalf:
‘We’ll still be in charge—we’ll have the majority of shares. Pret will
continue as it does… The deal wasn’t about money—we could have sold the shares
for much more to other buyers but they wouldn’t have provided the support we
need.’
After a long run of success, Pret has ambitious plans for the future.
It hopes to open at least 20 new stores a year in the UK. In late 2002 it
opened its first store in Tokyo, Japan, in partnership with McDonald’s. The
menu there is described as being 75 per cent ‘classic Pret’ with the remaining
25 per cent designed more to please local tastes. In other international
markets, the plan is to move cautiously—Pret’s first move will be to open more
stores in New York and Hong Kong, where it has already been successful.
Questions
1.
How has
Pret a Manger positioned its brand?
2.
Explain
how the different elements of the services marketing mix support and contribute
to the positioning of Pret a Manger.
Case V ‘Fast Fashion’: exploring how retailers get
affordable fashion on to the high street
The term ‘fast fashion’ has become very much de rigueur within the
fashion retailing industry. Retailers have to react quickly to changes in the
market, possess lean manufacturing operations, and utilize responsive supply
chains in order to get the latest fashions to the mass market. Stores such as
H&M, Zara, Mango, Top Shop and Benetton have been tremendously successful
in being responsive to the fashion needs of the market. Excellent logistical
and marketing information systems are seen as key to the implementation of the
‘fast fashion’ concept. ‘Fast fashion’ is the emphasis of putting fashionable
and affordable design concepts, which match consumer demand, on to the high
street as quickly as possible. These retailers get sought-after fashions into
stores in a matter of weeks, rather than the previous industry norm, which
relied on production lead times ranging from six months to a year. The concept
of ‘fast fashion’ relies of a number of central components: excellent marketing
information systems, flexible production and logistics operations, excellent
communications within the supply chain, and leveraging advanced IT systems.
These components allow stores to track consumer demand, and deliver a rapid
response to changes in the marketplace. The results are invigorating for
fashion retailers, with ‘fast fashion’ retailers’ sales growing by 11 per cent,
compared with the industry norm of 2 per cent.
Within the fashion industry a number of different levels exist, the
exclusive haute couture ranges (made to measure), the designer ready-to-wear
collections, and then copycat designs by mass-market retailers. Fashion has now
gone to the high street, becoming more democratic for the mass market.
The traditional fashion- retailing model was seasonal, whereby
retailers would typically launch two seasons: spring and autumn collections.
Fashion retailers would buy for these collections from their supplier network a
year in advance, and allow for between 20-30 per cent of their purchasing
budgets open to specific fashion changes in the market. Typically, retailers
would have perennial offerings that rarely change as well as catering to the
whims of fashion, such as basic T-shirts and jeans.
Now, through the ‘fast fashion’ philosophy, new items are being stocked
in stores more frequently. These newer product ranges stimulate shoppers into
frequenting these stores on a more regular basis, in some cases weekly to see
new fashion items. Savvy brand-loyal shoppers know when new stock is being
delivered to their favourite store. Through increased stock replenishment of
new, fashionable items, consumers are increasing their footfall to these
stores, and furthermore these stores are developing brand images as cutting
edge, trendy, and fashionable. This increased footfall, where shoppers
regularly visit a store, eliminates the need for major expenditure on advertising
and promotion. Also the concept of ‘fast fashion’ is helping to improve sales,
conversion ratios within these stores. Due to the limited supply of designs
available, this creates an aura of exclusivity for these garments, further
enhancing the brands of these ‘fast fashion retailers’ as leading fashion
brands.
Famous for ABBA, Volvos and IKEA, now Sweden has another international
success story: H&M. The basic business premise behind H&M is ‘fashion
and quality at the best price’. The company now has over 1068 stores in 21
countries. H&M sources 50 per cent of its goods in Europe and the remainder
in low-cost Asian countries. Sourcing decisions are dependent on cost, quality,
lead times and export regulations. The lead times for items can vary from a
minuscule two weeks to six months, dependent on the item itself. H&M
believes that having very short lead times can be beneficial in terms of stock
control, however it is not the most important criteria for all items. Basic
clothing garments can have lead times running into months, due to consistent
demand. However, items that are more trend- and fashion-conscious require very
short lead times, to match demand. H&M is now also in the process of
teaming up with prestigious designers like Karl Lagerfeld to create affordable
fashion ranges.
The firm utilizes close relationships with its network of production
offices and 700 suppliers. Unlike some other clothing retailers, H&M
outsources all of its production to independent suppliers. The dyeing of
garments is postponed until as late as possible in the production process to
allow greater flexibility and adaptation to the whims of the fashion buyer.
Items from around the world are shipped to a centralized transit warehouse in
Hamburg, Germany, where quality checks are undertaken, and the items are
allocated to individual stores or placed in centralized storage. Items that are
placed in this ‘call-off warehouse’ are allocated to stores where there is more
demand for the particular item. For example, if pairs of a particular style of
jeans are selling well in London, more jeans are shipped from Hamburg to
H&M’s London stores.
Table 6: Some of the key players in apparel industry
|
H&M
|
Next
|
Benetton
|
|
Originated in Sweden
|
Originated in the UK
|
Originated in Italy
|
|
Chain has 1069 stores in 21 countries
|
Has 380 stores in the UK and Ireland and has 80 franchise stores
overseas
|
Has a presence in 120 countries and uses a retail network o 5000
stores
|
|
Originally called Hennes & Mauritz, renamed as H&M. Sells
women’s and men’s apparel. Doesn’t own any manufacturing resources.
Motto—‘Fashion and quality at the best price’.
|
Sells women’s wear, men’s wear and homeware. The firm has a very
successful catalogue business. Targets the top end of the mass market,
focusing on fashionable moderately priced clothing
|
Sell under brand name such as Benetton, Playlife, Sisley and Killer
Loop. Uses a network of franchises/partner stores. Established huge brand
awareness through its infamous ad campaigns.
|
|
Zara
|
Mango
|
Arcadia
|
|
Originated in Spain
|
Originated in Spain
|
Originated in the UK
|
|
Chain has 729 Zara stores
|
Chain has 770 stores in 70 countries
|
Chain has over 2000 stores
|
|
Zara is the main part of the Spanish
Inditex group and is valued at nearly €14 billion. Operates under the mantra
of affordable fashion, and adopts the principle of market-driven supply.
|
Operates a successful franchise operation
(more than half are franchises). The company specializes exclusively in
targeting the young female mid-market.
|
Operates several different fascia,
targeting different types of customer, with stores such as Burton, Dorothy
Perkins, Evans, Wallis, Top Shop, Top Man, Miss Selfridge and Outfit. Owner
Philip Green also owns BHS stores and Etam UK
|
Sourcing low-cost garments with quick response times is a vital element
of the concept. Many of the ‘fast fashion’ retailers utilize a vast network of
suppliers, so that their stores are replenished with latest designs. Some firms
are entirely vertically integrated, where the retailer owns and controls the
entire supply chain. For example, Zara buys its fabric from a company owned by
its parent, Inditex, and buys dyes from another company also within the group.
Retailers source their goods from countries such as China, North Africa, Turkey
and low-cost eastern European countries. If cost were the sole basis for
supplier selection, then the vast majority of products would be sourced from
the Far East. However, the lead times for delivery of goods are quite
substantial in comparison to sourcing garments in Eastern Europe (e.g. shipping
goods from China can take sex weeks, whereas from Hungary takes two days). As a
result of this, retailers are using a hybrid approach, sourcing closer to
markets for more fashion-orientated lines. The drive towards reduced lead times
is allowing companies to be more responsive to market changes. The benefits of
such a quick response to market changes are reduced costs, lean inventories,
faster merchandise flow and closer collaborative supply chain relationships.
The concept of ‘postponement’ is a key strategy used within the fashion
retailing industry. It is the delayed configuration of a garment’s final design
until the final market destination and/or customer requirement is known and,
once this is known, the garment is assembled or customized. The material and
styles are kept generic for a long as possible, before final customization. A
classic illustration of the concept of postponement is its usage by Benetton.
Colours can come in and out of fashion.
Benetton delays when its garments are finally product differentiated, so
that this matches what is selling. For example, a Benetton sweater would be
stitched and assembled from its original grey yarn and then, based on feedback
from Benetton’s distribution network as to what colours were selling, the
sweater would be dyed at the very final stage of production. The concept of
postponement allows greater inventory cost saving, and increased flexibility in
matching actual demand.
The production and logistics facilities for these ‘fast fashion’
retailers are colossal in that each design may have several colour variants,
and the retailer needs to produce an array of garments in a number of different
sizes. The number of stock keeping units (SKUs) is therefore staggering. As a
result, companies require a very reliable and sophisticated information
system—for example, Zara has to deal with over 300,000 new SKUs every year.
Benetton has a fully automated sorting and shipping system, managing over 110 million
items a year, with a staff of only 24 employees in its centralized distribution
centres. Mango, another successful Spanish fashion chain, also utilizes a
high-tech distribution system, which can sort and pack 12,000 folded items an
hour and 7000 hanging garments an hour.
Many in the industry see Zara as the classic illustration of the
concept of ‘fast fashion’ in operation. The company can get a garment from
design, through production and ultimately on to the shelf in a mere 15 days.
The norm for the industry has typically run to several months. The group’s
basic business philosophy is to seduce customers with the latest fashion at
attractive prices. It has grown rapidly as a fashion retail powerhouse by
adopting four central strategies: creativity and innovation; having an
international presence; utilizing a multi-format strategy; and through
vertically integrating its entire supply chain. For the ‘fast fashion’ concept
to be successful, it requires close relationships between suppliers and retailers,
information sharing and utilization of technology. Information is utilized
along the entire supply chain, according to the demand. It controls design,
production and the logistics elements of the business. Real-time demand feeds
the production systems.
Zara is part of the Inditex group of fashion retail brands. This group
adopts a multi-format strategy with different store brands targeting different
types of customers. Zara is its key fashion-retailing brand. Zara opened its
first store in 1975 in Spain and has now become a fashion powerhouse, operating
in four continents, with 729 stores, located in over 54 countries. It has
become very hip all over the world, for its value for money and stylish
designs. The chain is building large numbers of brand devotees because of its
fashionable designs, which are in tune with the very latest trends, and a very
convincing price-quality offering. Each of the different store brands (outlined
in Table- 7) needs to be strongly differentiated in order for the strategy to work
effectively.
Table 7 Number of Inditex stores by fascia
|
Zara
|
729
|
|
Pull and Bear
|
373
|
|
Massimo Dutti
|
330
|
|
Bershka
|
305
|
|
Stradivarius
|
228
|
|
Oysho
|
106
|
|
Zara Home
|
63
|
|
Kiddy’s Class
|
131
|
|
TOTAL
|
2265
|
Figure 3 Zara’s market-led supply
Zara does not undertake any conventional advertising, except as a
vehicle for announcing a new store opening, the start of sales of seasons. The
company uses the stores themselves as its main promotional strategy, to convey
its image. Zara tries to locate its stores in prime commercial areas. Deep
inside the lairs of its corporate headquarters, 25 full-scale store windows are
set up, whereby Zara window designers can experiment with design layouts and
lighting. The approved design layouts are shipped out to all Zara’s stores, so
that a Zara shop front in London will be the same as in Lisbon and throughout
the entire chain. The store itself is the company’s main promotional vehicle.
One of Zara’s key philosophies was the realization that fashion, much
like food, has a ‘best before’ date: that fashion trends change rapidly. What
style consumers want this month may not be same in two months’ time. Fashion
retailers have to adapt to what the marketplace wants for the here and now. The
company is guilty of under-stocking garments, as it does not want to be left
with obsolete or out-of-fashion items. The key driving force behind its success
is to minimize inventory levels, getting product out on to the retail floor
space, and by being responsive to the needs of the market. Zara uses its stores
to find out what consumers really want, designs are selling, what colours are
in demand, which items are hot sellers and which are complete flops. It uses a
sophisticated marketing information system to provide feedback to headquarters
and allow it to respond to what the marketplace wants. Similarly, Mango uses a
computerized logistical system that allows the matching of clothes designs to
particular stores based on personality traits and even climate variances (i.e.
‘It this garment suitable for the Mediterranean Summer?). This sophisticated IT
infrastructure allows for more responsive market-led retailing, matching
suitable clothing lines to compatible stores.
At the end of each day, Zara sales assistants report to the store
manager using wireless headsets, to communicate inventory levels. The stores
then report back to Zara’s design and distribution departments on what
consumers are buying, asking for or avoiding. Both hard sales data and soft
data (i.e. customer feedback on the latest designs) are communicated directly
back to the company’s headquarters, through open channels of communication.
Zara’s 250 designers use market feedback for their next creations. Designers
work hand in hand with market analyst, in cross-functional teams, to pick up on
the latest trends. Garments are produced in comparatively small production
runs, so as not to be over-exposed if a particular item is a very poor seller.
If a product is a poor seller, it is removed after as little as two weeks.
Roughly 10 per cent of stock falls into this unsold category, in direct
contrast to industry norms of between 17 and 20 per cent. Zara produces nearly
11,000 designs a year. Stock items are seen as assets that are extremely perishable
and, if they are sitting on shelves or racks in a warehouse, they are simply
not making money for the organization.
In the course of one year alone, Zara has been able to launch 24
different collections into its network of stores. After designs have been
approved, fabrics are dyed and cut by highly automated production lines. These
pre-cut pieces are then sent out of nearly 350 workshops in northern Spain and
Portugal. These workshops employ nearly 11,000 ‘grey economy’ workers mainly
women, who may want to supplement their income. Seamstresses stitch the pre-cut
pieces into garments using easy-to-follow instructions supplied by Zara. The
typical seamstress’s wage in Zara’s workshop network is extremely competitive
when compared with those in ‘third world’ countries where other fashion
retailers mainly outsource their production. Furthermore, the proximity of
these workshops allows for greater flexibility and control, Zara achieves
greater control over its supply chain through having a high degree of
integration within the supply chain. By owning suppliers, Zara has greater
control production capacities, quality and scheduling. This is in stark
contrast to Benetton, which is close to being a virtual organization,
outsourcing production to third-party suppliers and directly owning only a
handful of its stores, the majority being franchises or partner stores.
The finished garments are then sent back to Zara’s colossal
state-of-the-art logistics centre. Here they are electronically tagged, quality
control double-checks them, and then they are sorted into distribution lots,
ensuring the items arrive at their ultimate destinations. Each item is tagged
with pricing information. There is no pan-European pricing for Zara’s products:
prices are different in each national market. Zara believes each national
market has its own particular nuances, such as higher salaries or higher
taxation, therefore it has to adjust the price of each garment to make it
suitable in each country and to reflect these differences. Shipments leave La
Coruňa bound for every one of the Zara stores in over 54 countries twice a
week, every week. The company’s average turnaround time from designing to
delivery of a new garment takes on average 10 to 15 days, and delivery of goods
takes a maximum of 21 days, which is unparalleled in an industry where lead
times are usually months, not days. Zara’s business model tries to fulfil
real-time fashion retailing and not second-guessing what consumers’ needs are
for next season, which may be six months away. As a result of Zara utilizing
this ultra-responsive supply chain, 85 per cent of its entire product range
obtains full ticket price, whereas the industry norm is between 60 and 70 per
cent.
The successful adoption of the ‘fast fashion’ concept by these
international retailers has drastically altered the competitive landscape in
apparel retailing. Consumers’ expectations are also rising with these improved
retail offerings. Clothes shoppers are seeking out the latest fashions at
value-for-money prices in enticing store environments. Now other
well-established high-street fashion retailers have to adapt to these
challenges, by being more responsive, cost efficient, speedy and flexible in
their operations. The rag trade is churning out the latest value-for-money
fashions at breakneck speed. ‘Fast fashion’ is what the marketplace is
demanding.
Questions
1.
Discuss
how supply chain management can contribute to the marketing success of these
retailers.
2.
Discuss
the central components necessary for the fast fashion concept to work
effectively.
3.
Critically
evaluate the concept of ‘market-driven supply’, discussing the merits and
pitfalls of its implementation in fashion retailing.
Attempt Any Four Case Study
CASE – 1 Dabur India Limited: Growing Big and Global
Dabur is among
the top five FMCG companies in India and is positioned successfully on the
specialist herbal platform. Dabur has proven its expertise in the fields of
health care, personal care, homecare and foods.
The company was
founded by Dr. S. K. Burman in 1884 as small pharmacy in Calcutta (now
Kolkata), India. And is now led by his great grandson Vivek C. Burman, who is
the Chairman of Dabur India Limited and the senior most representative of the
Burman family in the company. The company headquarters are in Ghaziabad, India,
near the Indian capital New Delhi, where it is registered. The company has over
12 manufacturing units in India and abroad. The international facilities are
located in Nepal, Dubai, Bangladesh, Egypt and Nigeria.
S.K. Burman,
the founder of Dabur, was trained as a physician. His mission was to provide
effective and affordable cure for ordinary people in far-flung villages. Soon,
he started preparing natural remedies based on Ayurved for diseases such as
Cholera, Plague and Malaria. Due to his cheap and effective remedies, he became
to be known as ‘Daktar’ (Indianised version of ‘doctor’). And that is how his
venture Dabur got its name—derived from Daktar Burman.
The company
faces stiff competition from many multi national and domestic companies. In the
Branded and Packaged Food and Beverages segment major companies that are active
include Hindustan Lever, Nestle, Cadbury and Dabur. In case of Ayurvedic
medicines and products, the major competitors are Baidyanath, Vicco, Jhandu,
Himani and other pharmaceutical companies.
Vision, Mission and Objectives
Vision statement of Dabur says
that the company is “dedicated to the
health and well being of every household”. The objective is to “significantly accelerate profitable growth
by providing comfort to others”. For achieving this objective Dabur aims
to:
·
Focus on growing core brands across categories,
reaching out to new geographies, within and outside India, and improve
operational efficiencies by leveraging technology.
·
Be the preferred company to meet the health and
personal grooming needs of target consumers with safe, efficacious, natural
solutions by synthesising deep knowledge of ayurveda and herbs with modern
science.
·
Be a professionally managed employer of choice,
attracting, developing and retaining quality personnel.
·
Be responsible citizens with a commitment to
environmental protection.
·
Provide superior returns, relative to our peer
group, to our shareholders.
Chairman of the company
Vivek C. Burman joined Dabur in
1954 after completing his graduation in Business Administration from the USA.
In 1986 he was appointed Managing Director of Dabur and in 1998 he took over as
Chairman of the Company.
Under Vivek
Burman’s leadership, Dabur has grown and evolved as a multi-crore business
house with a diverse product portfolio and a marketing network that traverses
the whole of India and more than 50 countries across the world. As a strong and
positive leader, Vivek C. Burman has motivated employees of Dabur to “do better
than their best”—a credo that gives Dabur its status as India’s most trusted
nature-based products company.
Leading brands
More than 300 diverse products in
the FMCG, Healthcare and Ayurveda segments are in the product line of Dabur.
List of products of the company include very successful brands like Vatika,
Anmol, Hajmola, Dabur Amla Chyawanprash, Dabur Honey and Lal Dant Manjan with
turnover of Rs.100 crores each.
Strategic
positioning of Dabur Honey as food product, lead to market leadership with over
40% market share in branded honey market; Dabur Chyawanprash is the largest
selling Ayurvedic medicine with over 65% market share. Dabur is a leader in
herbal digestives with 90% market share. Hajmola tablets are in command with
75% market share of digestive tablets category. Dabur Lal Tail tops baby
massage oil market with 35% of total share.
CHD (Consumer
Health Division), dealing with classical Ayurvedic medicines has more than 250
products sold through prescription as well as over the counter. Proprietary
Ayurvedic medicines developed by Dabur include Nature Care Isabgol, Madhuvaani
and Trifgol.
However, some
of the subsidiary units of Dabur have proved to be low margin business; like
Dabur Finance Limited. The international units are also operating on low profit
margin. The company also produces several “me – too” products. At the same time
the company is very popular in the rural segment.
Questions
1.
What is the objective of Dabur? Is it profit
maximisation or growth maximisation? Discuss.
2.
Do you think the growth of Dabur from a small pharmacy
to a large multinational company is an indicator of the advantages of joint
stock company against proprietorship form? Elaborate.
CASE – 2 IT Industry: Checkered Growth
IT industry is now considered as
vital for the development of any economy. Developing countries value the
importance of this industry due to its capacity to provide much needed export
earnings and support in the development of other industries. Especially in
Indian context, this industry has assumed a significant position in the overall
economy, due to its exemplary potentials in creating high value jobs, enhancing
business efficiency and earning export revenues. The IT revolution has brought
unexpected opportunities for India, which is emerging as an increasingly
preferred location for customised software development. Experts are estimating
the global IT industry to grow to US$1.6 million over the coming six years and
exports to reach Rs. 2000 billion by 2008. It is envisaged that Indian IT industry,
though a very small portion of the global IT pie, has tremendous growth
prospects.
Stock Taking
The decade of 1970 may be taken
as the stage of introduction of the Indian IT industry. The early years were
marked by 75 per cent of software development taking place overseas and the
rest 25 per cent in India. Exports of Indian software until the mid-1970s was
mainly Eastern Europe, followed by US. Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) was
among the pioneers in selling its services outside India, by working for IBM
Labs in the US. The hardware segment lagged behind its software counterpart.
With instances of exports worth US$ 4 million in 1980, the software segment of
the industry has shown an uneven profile. It was not until 1980s that vigorous
and sustained growth in software exports begun, as MNCs like Texas Instruments
started to take serious interest in India as a centre of software production.
Destinations of export also underwent changes, with US dominating the main
export market with 75 per cent of the exports. The IT Enabled Services (ITeS)
segment, however, had not emerged at this stage.
It was also
during the mid to late 1980s that computer firms shifted focus from mainframe
computers (the mainstay of MNCs) to Personal Computers (PCs). In March 1985,
Minicomp installed the first ever PC at CSI, Delhi; this changed the entire
industry for good. With the entry of networking and applications like CAD/CAM,
PC sales soared in 1987-88, touching 50,000 units.
From a modest
growth in the mid-1980s software exports moved up to Rs. 3.8 billion in
1991-92. Since then, it grew at an incredible rate, up to 115 per cent in 1993.
The hardware could also register an annual growth of 40 per cent in this
period, backed by a surging demand for PCs and networking. Growth of the
industry was also driven by the emergence and rapid growth of the ITeS segment.
IT sector’s
share of GDP rose steadily in this period, rate of increase being the highest
at 44.91 per cent in 2000-01. It was in the same year that the size of the
total IT market was the biggest in the decade, at Rs. 56,592 crore. The overall
IT market was also found to increase till 2000-01. The overall IT market was
also found to increase till 2000-01, with the only exception of 1998-99. The
domestic market also showed an overall increase till 2000-01, registering a
spectacular CAGR of 50.39 per cent. Aggregate output of software and services
also increased in this period, though at an uneven rate. Of approximately $1
billion worth of sales in 1991-1992, domestic hardware sales constituted 37.2
per cent (13.4 per cent growth over the previous year), exports of hardware 6.6
per cent.
During 2000-01
the growth in the hardware segment was driven mainly by PCs, which contributed
about 58 per cent of the total hardware market. This period also witnessed the
phenomenon of increasing share of Tier 2 and cities in PC sales, thereby
indicating PC penetration into the hinterland. PC shipments had increased by 35
per cent every year from 1997 till 2000-01 when it reached 1.8 million PCs. The
commercial PC market saw a growth of 23.5 per cent mainly due to slashing of
prices by major vendors.
It was in
2001-02 that the industry had a sharp fall in rate of growth of its share of
GDP to 5.90 per cent, from 44.91 per cent in the previous year. The total IT
market also showed a fall in growth rate from 56.42 per cent in 2000-01 to a
mere 16.24 per cent in the next year, growing further at the rate of 16.25 per
cent in the next year. Software export was also affected, registering a low
growth of 28.74 per cent and failed to maintain its growth rate of 65.30 per
cent in the previous year. It got further lowered to 26.30 per cent in 2002-03.
CAGR of total output of software and services (in Rs. crore) came down to 25.61
in 2001-02 and further to 25.11 in 2002-03. The domestic market showed a steep
decline in growth to 3 per cent in 2001-02 from an outstanding 50.39 per cent
in 2000-01. It could, however, recover by growing at 4.11 per cent in the next
year.
Table 1: Indian IT Industry: 1996-97 to 2002-03
|
Year
|
A*
|
B*
|
C*
|
D*
|
E*
|
|
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
|
1.22
1.45
1.87
2.71
2.87
3.09
|
18,641
25,307
36,179
56,592
65,788
76,482
|
3,900
6,530
10,940
17,150
28,350
36,500
46,100
|
6,594
10,899
16,879
23,980
37,350
47,532
59,472
|
9,438
12,055
14,227
18,837
28,330
29,181
30,382
|
|
*A: share of GDP of the Indian
IT market, B: size of the Indian IT market (in Rs. crore), C: software and
services exports (in Rs. crore), D: size of software and services (in Rs.
crore), E: size of the domestic market (in Rs. crore)
Questions
1.
Try to identify various stages of growth of IT
industry on basis of information given in the case and present a scenario for
the future.
2.
Study the table given. Apply trend projection method
on the figures and comment on the trend.
3.
Compute a 3 year moving average forecast for the
years 1997-98 through 2003-04.
CASE –
3 Outsourcing to India: Way to Fast Track
By almost any
measure, David Galbenski’s company Contract Counsel was a success. It was a
company Galbenski and a law school buddy, Mark Adams, started in 1993; it
helps companies find lawyers on a temporary contract basis. The growth over
the past five years had been furious. Revenue went from less than $200,000 to
some $6.5 million at the end of 2003, and the company was placing thousands
of lawyers a year.
At then the
revenue growth began to flatten; the company grew just 8% in 2004 despite a
robust market for legal services estimated at about $250 billion in the
United States alone. Frustrated and concerned, Galbenski stepped back and
began taking a hard look at his business. Could he get it back on the fast
track? “Most business books say that the hardest threshold to cross is that
$10 million sales mark,” he says. “I knew we couldn’t afford to grow only 10%
a year. We needed to blow right through that number.”
For that to
happen, Galbenski knew he had to expand his customer base beyond the Midwest
into large legal supermarkets such as Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C.
He also knew that in doing so, he could run into stiff competition from
larger publicly traded rivals. Contract Counsel’s edge has always been its
low price, Clients called when dealing with large-scale litigation or
complicated merger and acquisition deals, either of which can require as many
as 100 lawyers to manage the discovery process and the piles of documents
associated with it. Contract Counsel’s temps cost about $75 an hour, roughly
half of what a law firm would charge, which allowed the company to be
competitive despite its relatively small size. Galbenski was counting on
using the same strategy as he expanded into new cities. But would that be
enough to spur the hyper growth that he craved for?
At that time,
Galbenski had been reading quite a bit about the growing use of offshore
employees. He knew companies like General Electric, Microsoft and Cisco were
saving bundles by setting up call and data centers in India. Could law firms offshore
their work? Galbenski’s mind raced with possibilities. He imagined tapping
into an army of discount-priced legal minds that would mesh with his existing
talent pool in the U.S. The two work forces could collaborate over the Web
and be productive on a 24-7 basis. And the cost could be massive.
Using offshore
workers was a risk, but the payoff was potentially huge. Incidentally
Galbenski and his eight-person management team were preparing to meet for
their semiannual review meeting. The purpose of the two-day event was to
decide the company’s goals for the coming year. Driving to the meeting,
Galbenski struggled to figure out exactly what he was going to say. He was
still undecided about whether to pursue an incremental and conservative national
expansion or take a big gamble on overseas contractors.
The Decision
The next morning Galbenski
kicked off the management meeting. Galbenski laid out the facts as he saw
them. Rather than look at just the next five years of growth, look at the next
20, he said. He cited a Forrester Research prediction that some 79,000 legal
jobs, totaling $5.8 billion in wages, would be sent offshore by 2015. He
challenged his team to be pioneers in creating a new industry, rather than
stragglers racing to catch up. His team applauded. Returning to the office
after the meeting, Galbenski announced the change in strategy to his 20
full-timers.
Then he and
his team began plotting a global action plan. The first step was to hire a
company out of Indianapolis, Analysts International, to start compiling a
list of the best legal services providers in countries where people had
comparatively strong English skills. The next phase was vetting the companies
in person. In February 2005, just three months after the meeting in Port
Huron, Galbenski found himself jetting off on a three months trip to scout
potential contractors in India, Dubai, and Sri Lanka. Traveling to cities
like Bangalore, Chennai and Hyderabad, he interviewed executives from more
than a dozen companies, investigating their day-to-day operations firsthand.
India seemed
like the best bet. With more than 500 law schools and about 200,000 law
students graduating each year, it had no shortage or attorneys. What amazed Galbenski,
however, was that thanks to the Web, lawyers in India had access to the same
research tools and case summaries as any associate in the U.S. Sure, they
didn’t speak American English. “But they were highly motivated, highly
intelligent, and extremely process-oriented,” he says. “They were also eager
to tackle the kinds of tasks that most new associated at law firms look down
upon” such as poring over and coding thousands of documents in advance of a
trial. In other words, they were perfect for the kind of document-review work
he had in mind.
After a return
visit to India in August 2005, Galbenski signed a contract with two legal
services companies: QuisLex, in Hyderabad, and Manthan Services in Bangalore.
Using their lawyers and paralegals, Galbenski figured he could cut his
document-review rates to $50 an hour. He also outsourced the maintenance of
the database used to store the contact information for his thousands of
contractors. In all, he spent about 12 months and $250,000 readying his newly
global company. Convincing U.S. based clients to take a chance on the new
service hasn’t been easy. In November, Galbenski lined up pilot programs with
four clients (none of which are ready to publicise their use of offshore
resources). To help get the word out, he launched a website
(offshore-legal-services.com), which includes a cache of white papers and
case studies to serve as a resource guide for companies interested in
outsourcing.
Questions
1.
As money costs will decrease due to decision to
outsource human resource, some real costs and opportunity costs may surface.
What could these be?
2.
Elaborate the external and internal economies of
scale as occurring to Contract Counsel.
3.
Can you see some possibility of economies of scope
from the information given in the case? Discuss.
|
|||||
CASE – 4 Indian Stock Market: Does it Explain Perfect
Competition?
The stock
market is one of the most important sources for corporates to raise capital. A
stock exchange provides a market place, whether real or virtual, to facilitate
the exchange of securities between buyers and sellers. It provides a real time
trading information on the listed securities, facilitating price discovery.
Participants in
the stock market range from small individual investors to large traders, who
can be based anywhere in the world. Their orders usually end up with a
professional at a stock exchange, who executes the order. Some exchanges are
physical locations where transactions are carried out on a trading floor. The
other type of exchange is of a virtual kind, composed of a network of computers
and trades are made electronically via traders.
By design a
stock exchange resembles perfect competition. Large number of rational profit
maximisers actively competing with each other, trying to predict future market
value of individual securities comprises the main feature of any stock market.
Important current information is almost freely available to all participants.
Price of individual security is determined by market forces and reflects the
effect of events that have already occurred and are expected to occur. In the
short run it is not easy for a market player to either exit or enter; one
cannot exit and enter for few days in those stocks which are under no delivery.
For example Tata Steel was in no delivery from 29/10/07 to 02/11/07. Similarly
one cannot enter or exit on those stocks which are in upper or lower circuit
for few regular trading sessions. Therefore a player has to depend wholly on
market price for its profit maximizing output (in this case stock of
securities). In the long run players may exit the market if they are not able
to earn profit, but at the same time new investors are attracted by rise in
market price.
As on 01/11/07
total market capital at Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) is $1589.43 billion
(source: Business Standard, 1/11/2007); out of this individual investors
account for only $100bn. In spite of the fact that individual investors exist
in a very large number, their capital base is less than 7% of total market
capital; rest of capital is owned by foreign institutional investor and
domestic institutional investors (FIIs and DIIs), which are very small in
number. Average capital owned by a single large player is huge in comparison to
small investor. This situation seems to have prompted Dr Dash of BSE to comment
‘The stock market activity is increasingly becoming more centralised,
concentrated and non competitive, serving interest of big players only.” Table
2 shows the impact of change in FII on National Stock Exchange movement during
three different time periods.
Table 2: Impact of FIIs’ Investment on NSE
|
Wave
|
Date
|
Nifty
close
|
Change in Nifty Index
|
FLLS Net Investment
(Rs.Cr.)
|
Change in Market Capitalisation
(Rs.Cr.)
|
|
Wave 1
From
To
|
17/05/04
26/10/05
|
1388.75
2408.50
|
1019.75
|
59520
|
5,40,391
|
|
Wave 2
From
To
|
27/10/05
11/05/06
|
2352.90
3701.05
|
1348.15
|
38258
|
6,20,248
|
|
Wave 3
From
To
|
12/05/06
13/06/06
|
3650.05
2663.30
|
-986.75
|
-9709
|
-4,60,149
|
By design, an
Indian Stock Market resembles perfect competition, not as a complete
description (for no markets may satisfy all requirements of the model) but as
an approximation.
Questions
1.
Is stock market a good example of perfect competition?
Discuss.
2.
Identify the characteristics of perfect competition in
the stock market setting.
3.
Can you find some basic aspect of perfect competition
which is essentially absent in stock market?
CASE – 5 The Indian Audio Market
The Indian
audio market pyramid is featured by the traditional radios forming its lower
bulk. Besides this, there are four other distinct segments: mono recorders
(ranking second in the pyramid), stereo recorders, midi systems (which offer
the sound amplification of a big system, but at a far lower price and expected
to grow at 25% per year) and hi-fis (minis and micros, slotted at the top end
of the market).
Today the
Indian audio market is abound with energy and action as both national and
international majors are trying to excel themselves and elbow the others,
ushering in new concepts, like CD sound, digital tuners, full logic tape deck,
etc. The main players in the Indian audio market are Philips, BPL and Videocon.
Of these, Philips is one of the oldest and is considered at the leading
national brands. In fact it was the first company to introduce a range of
international products such as CD radio cassette recorder, stand alone CD
players and CD mini hi-fi systems. With the easing of the entry barriers, a
number of new international players like Panasonic, Akai, Sansui, Sony, Sharp,
Goldstar, Samsung and Aiwa have also entered the arena. This has led to a sea
of changes in the industry and resulted in an expanded market and a happier
customer, who has access to the latest international products at competitive
prices. The rise in the disposable income of the average Indian, especially the
upper-income section, has opened up new vistas for premium products and has
provided a boost to companies to launch audio systems priced as high as Rs.
50,000 and beyond.
Pricing across Segments
Super Premium Segment: This segment of the market is largely
price-insensitive, as consumers are willing to pay a premium in order to obtain
products of high quality. Sonodyne has positioned itself in this segment by
concentrating on products that are too small for large players to operate in
profitably. It has launched a range of systems priced between Rs. 30,000 to Rs.
60,000. National Panasonic has launched its super premium range of systems by
the name of Technics.
Premium Segment: Much of the price game is taking place in this
segment, in which systems are priced around Rs. 25,000. Even the foreign
players ensure that the pricing is competitive. Entry barriers of yester years
compelled the demand by this segment to be partially met by the grey market.
With the opening up of the market, the premium segment is witnessing a rapid
growth and is currently estimated to be worth Rs. 30 crores. Growth of this
segment is also being driven by consumers who want to upgrade their old music
systems. Another major stimulating factor is the plethora of financing options
available, bringing more and more consumers to the market.
Philips has understood the Indian
listener well enough to dictate the basic principles of segmentation. It
projects its products as high quality at medium price. In fact, Philips had
successfully spotted an opportunity in the wide price gap between portable
cassette players and hi-fi systems and pioneered the concept of a midi system
(a three-in-one containing radio, tape deck and amplifier in one unit). Philips
has also realised that there is a section of the rich consumer which values not
just power but also clarity and is willing to pay for it. The pricing strategy
of Philips was to make the most of its image as a technology leader. To this
end, it used non-price variables by launching of a range of state of art
machines like the FW series, and CD players. Moreover, it came up with the
punch line in its advertisements as, “We Invent For You”.
BPL stands
second only to Philips in the audio market and focuses on technology as its
USP. Its kingpin in the marketing mix is its high technology superior quality
product. It is thus at being the product-quality leader. BPL’s proposition of
fidelity is translated in its punchline for its audio systems as, ‘e-fi your
imagination’ (d-fi stands for digital fidelity). The company follows a market
skimming strategy. When a new product was launched, it was placed in the top
end of the market, and priced accordingly. The company offers a range of
products in all price segments in the market without discounting the brand.
Another major
player, Videocon, has managed to price its products lower even in the premium
segment. The success of the Powerhouse (a 160 watt midi launched by Philips in
1990) had prompted Videocon to launch the Select Sound range of midi stereo systems
at a slightly lower price. At the premium end, Videocon is making efforts to
upgrade its image to being “quality-driven” by associating itself with the
internationally reputed brand name of Sansui from Japan, and following a
perceived value pricing method.
Sony is another
brand which is positioning itself as a premium product and charges a higher
price for the superior quality of sound it offers. Unlike indulging into price
wars, Sony’s ad-campaigns project the message that nothing can beat Sony in the
quality and intensity of sound. National Panasonic is another player that has
three products in the top end of the market, priced in the Rs. 21,000 to Rs.
32,000 range.
Monos and Stereos: Videocon has 21% share I the overall audio
market, but has been a major player only in personal stereos and two-in-ones.
Its history is written with instances where it has offered products of similar
quality, but at much lower prices than its competitors. In fact, Videocon
launched the Sansui brand of products with a view to transform its image from
that of being a manufacturer of cheap products to that of being a company that
primes quality, and also to obtain a share of the hi-fi segment. Sansui is
being positioned as a premium brand, targeting the higher middle, upper income
groups and also the sensitive middle class Indian consumer.
The objective
of Philips in this segment is to achieve higher sales volumes and hence its
strategy is to expand its range and have a product in every segment of the
market. The pricing method used by Philips in this segment is providing value
for money.
National
Panasonic offers products in the lower end of the market, apart from the top of
the range. In fact, it reduced the price of one of its small two-in-ones from
Rs. 3,500 to Rs. 2,400, with the logic that a forte in the lower end of the
market would help in building brand reliability across a wider customer base.
The company is also guided by the logic that operating in the price sensitive
region of the market will help it reach optimum levels of efficiency. Panasonic
has also entered the market for midis.
These apart,
there also exists a sector in the Indian audio industry, with powerful regional
brands in mono and stereo segments, having a market share of 59% in mono
recorders and 36% in stereo recorders. This sector has a strong influence on
price performance.
Questions
1.
What major pricing strategies have been discussed in
the case? How effective these strategies have been in ensuring success of the
company?
2.
Is perceived value pricing the dominant strategy of
major players?
3.
Which products have reached maturity stage in audio
industry? Do you think that product bundling can be effectively used for
promoting sale of these products?
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